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"FETCH SOME SOUPMEAT"
William N. Eskridge, Jr.*
Suppose a housekeeper says to a domestic: "fetch some
soupmeat," accompanying the act with giving some money to the
latter; he will be unable to execute the order without interpreta-
tion, however easy and, consequently, rapid the performance of
the process may be.'
Although first published over 150 years ago, Francis Lieber's
Legal and Political Hermeneutics remains broadly influential, and
the soupmeat hypothetical in particular has been reproduced in the
most widely read twentieth-century legal texts for teaching statu-
tory interpretation.2 The directive, "fetch some soupmeat," seems
straightforward in most situations, because the housekeeper and
the servant are operating under the same assumptions, and because
their shared assumptions are borne out as the servant goes about
his task. Lieber's project-and the project of any sophisticated
theoretical treatment of statutory interpretation-was to explore
the many ways in which "fetch some soupmeat" proves susceptible
to surprising interpretations. I should like to explore some varia-
tions of the hypothetical in order to demonstrate how Lieber's viv-
idly written treatise both anticipated twentieth-century theories
and suggested lines of deeper analyses than subsequent analysts
have been able to do. On the one hand, Lieber appreciates the
appeal of all the "foundational" theories of interpretation (one fac-
tor is the focus of the enterprise) and explicates these theories in
strikingly familiar terms. On the other hand, Hermeneutics is ec-
lectic and anti-foundational. Lieber's approach is on the whole
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to Michael
Herz for excellent comments on an earlier version of this article.
1 FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS, OR PRINCIPLES OF INTER-
PRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION IN LAW AND POLITICS 18 (William G. Hammond ed., 3d
ed., St. Louis, F.H. Thomas & Co. 1880) (1837), republished in 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 1883,
1904 (1995). [In subsequent citations, the page number as it appears in the republication
will be given in brackets following the page citation to the third edition.]
2 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGIS-
LATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 517-18 (2d. ed. 1995) (see pages
574-75 in the first edition published in 1988); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1114-
15 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); HARRY W. JONES ET AL.,
LEGAL METHOD: CASES AND TEXT MATERIALS 355-57 (1980). The soupmeat hypotheti-
cal is a key expositional device in my book: WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATU-
TORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
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most similar to a "practical reasoning" approach. I shall conclude,
however, with a discussion of the ways in which current theorizing
about statutory evolution has intellectually advanced beyond
Lieber's approach.
I. TEXTUALISM (RULE OF LAW)
Lieber insists that "one of the main ingredients of civil liberty,
and at the same time one of its greatest blessings, is the protection
against individual passion, violence, views, opinions, caprice or well
meant but disturbing interference-the supremacy of law."4 Her-
meneutics was written in order to facilitate this supremacy, or rule,
of law, for the book sets forth a systematic array of rules and prin-
ciples by which statutes can be interpreted in a determinate and
predictable manner. Hence, Lieber's first rule of statutory inter-
pretation is: "A sentence, or form of words, can have but one true
meaning."' 5 By that he meant that differently situated judges, law-
yers, and indeed citizens ought to be able to derive roughly the
same interpretation of a statutory text when applied to the same
set of circumstances. Only under a predictable and objectively de-
terminable rule of law can the citizenry be secure in its liberty.
Lieber contrasted this happy state of affairs with its alternative,
"subjective justice-an administration of justice according to the
subjective view of the judge, the substitution of individual feelings
and views for the general rule and equal law."' 6 This was unaccept-
able to Lieber, who blamed judges and lawyers-"an almost invin-
cible legion of harpies" 7 -for their historical roles in subverting the
rule of law.
Invocation of the rule of law, and of the importance of an ob-
jectively determinable method for applying the text across different
circumstances, is the key argument made by jurists and thinkers
from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Antonin Scalia to justify textual-
ism as the foundational method for interpreting statutes,8 and no
one has put the case for the "externality" (Holmes's term) of law
3 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
4 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 40 [at 1919].
5 Id. at 108 [at 1966].
6 Id. at 39 [at 1919].
7 Id. at 38 [at 1918].
8 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417
(1899); see also Lon L. Fuller,* The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62. HARV. L. REv.
616, 632-33 (1949) (opinion of Keen, J.); Antonin Scalia, Speech on the Use of Legislative
History (delivered between Fall 1985 and Spring 1986 at various law schools) (transcript on
file with author).
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better than Lieber. To say that the statutory interpreter should fo-
cus on the text tells us very little about how the interpreter should
treat the text, however. Notwithstanding the renewed appeal of an
objective textualist methodology, many twentieth-century thinkers
beg the critical questions of determinability that are exposed by
Lieber.
A. A Textualist Should Avoid Literalism
A literal-minded servant might return from the store empty-
handed, because there was nothing in the store explicitly labeled
"soupmeat." This is a boneheaded approach to interpretation:
under the guise of strict adherence to the words, it wrenches
them from their sense.
... It is false, deceptive, or artful interpretation, if we do
not give that sense to words which they ought to have, according
to good faith, common sense, the use which the utterer made of
them .... 9
Even the most ardent textualist should not, and presumably does
not, advocate boneheaded interpretation. Lieber's Hermeneutics
persuasively distinguishes between a plain meaning and a literalist
approach to statutory text. Still, the most sophisticated interpret-
ers oftentimes fall into Lieber's literalist fallacy, and the Supreme
Court has engaged in and 'encouraged an unhealthy literalism
through the dictionary fetishism of its recent opinions. 10
Significantly, Lieber does admit the desirability in some cases
of what he calls "close" interpretation, in which the interpreter
"take[s] the words in their narrowest meaning."" Close interpreta-
tion is most appropriate "[t]he more the text partakes of the char-
acter of a compact" between equal parties, for in such cases each
word may be presumed to have been bargained over. 12 Modern
textualists have echoed, and possibly distorted, this insight. Frank
Easterbrook, for example, calls for a close ("stingy") approach to
statutes that are essentially rent-seeking deals negotiated with leg-
9 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 56 [at 1930] (footnote omitted).
10 Most recently, and amusingly, in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 114
S. Ct. 2223 (1994). See also Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron
Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 355-58 (1994) (analyzing Court's increasing reliance on
dictionaries); Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L.
REv. 1437, 1437 (1994) ("In recent years... the Court has come to rely on dictionaries to
an unprecedented degree.").
11 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 54 [at 1928].
12 Id. at 121 [at 1977].
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islators by powerful groups. 13 Lieber would be cautious in apply-
ing this principle, because he viewed statutes and constitutions as
"contracts" having substantial third-party effects. Easterbrook
might respond that rent-seeking statutes have malign effects, but
his response is open to the caution that one person will see rent-
seeking where the next will see the public interest (as in Title VII,
for example).
B. Textual Plain Meaning Depends upon and
May Vary with Context
Lieber emphasized many sources of textual ambiguity. Chief
among them is the multiplicity of meanings a single word might
have, and the way in which context determines the "one true
meaning." Soupmeat, for example, is not a self-defining term, and
its meaning cannot be plucked out of a dictionary; instead, its
meaning will vary depending upon particular circumstances.
Soupmeat may be a term of art in the region or the household. If
the housekeeper has on previous occasions made it clear to the
servant that soupmeat signifies a certain kind of beef, the servant
would be a bad interpreter if he fetched chicken. Custom and prior
usage are clearly relevant when figuring out a text's meaning' 4 _
a precept whose lesson has sometimes been lost on current
interpreters.
The Supreme Court usually acts as though the same term has
the same meaning whenever it is used in a statutory scheme. 15 If it
is true that meaning depends on context, this assumption should
not be pressed too strongly. The same word uttered by the same
principal might have two different meanings if the contexts are ma-
terially different. Thus, if the servant fetching some soupmeat
knows that the soupmeat will be used at a fancy dinner, he might
also deduce that he should obtain a better cut of beef than he has
done when the soupmeat was used for simple family luncheons.
The same directive-"fetch some soupmeat"-might have subtly
different meanings in the two contexts, and the sensible textualist
will implement the same directive in different ways.' 6
13 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword The Court and
the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1984).
14 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 25-26 [at 1909-10].
15 See e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 660 (1994) ("A term appearing in
several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it appears").
16 This point is demonstrated by Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L.
REV. 1165 (1993). Michael Herz suggests that the point in text may undermine the idea of
textualism as a foundational methodology.
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C. Statutory Texts Evolve as Social Context Changes
Hermeneutics anticipates H.L.A. Hart's distinction between
the "core" coverage of a statute, and the "penumbras" of ambigu-
ity.17 Lieber observed that "terms receive a meaning, distinct as to
some points, but indistinct as to others, or . . . distinct as to the
central point of the space they cover, but become less so the farther
we remove from that centre, somewhat like certain territories of
civilized people bordering on wild regions."'" Thus, the servant
knowing that soupmeat means some kind of beef, but not of the
best quality, might be confronted with an array of different kinds of
beef from which choice is not completely predetermined. Lieber's
view is that there is still "one true meaning" of the directive, but
the servant must figure out that meaning through the exercise of
recalled experience and analogy. How have I (or another person
whom I have observed) made this choice in the past? How have
the past choices been received? Which cuts appear to be most ap-
propriate for today's luncheon? Today's interpreters, especially
those in the federal judiciary, are wont to mistake (or misstate)
penumbral applications of statutes for core applications, and
thereby to refuse to engage in this process of reasoning from expe-
rience and analogy.19
As time passes, a statute's central point (its core) grows
smaller, and the unanticipated wild regions (its penumbras) ex-
pand. Judges today sometimes approach statutes as self-contained
mechanisms whose meaning is set in stone for all time.2' Lieber
disagreed: "A code is not a herbarium, in which we deposit law like
dried plants. Let a code be the fruit grown out of the civil life of
a nation, and contain the seed for future growth."' 21 Even the
staunchest of the modem textualists agrees with this point, at least
in principle.22 Hermeneutics draws an analogy between evolving
17 H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
18 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 14-15 [at 1902]. Note how both Lieber and Hart usefully
deploy geographical metaphors to make their points.
19 Recent examples of hard-to-defend textual dogmatism include NLRB v. Health Care
& Retirement Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994) (compare the opinion for the Court with Jus-
tice Ginsburg's unanswerable dissenting arguments); Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank,
114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994) (compare the opinion for the Court with Justice Stevens's excellent
dissenting arguments).
20 See Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1439.
21 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 33-34 [at 1915].
22 See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (accepting the possibility that a text can evolve as circumstances
change but expressing a very narrow view of that principle); Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp
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statutory texts and the doctrine of cy pres, by which judges have
reconfigured wills and testaments to adapt to changing circum-
stances over time.23 Alex Johnson has recently retrieved this idea
and developed its implications for statutory interpretation theory.24
II. INTENTIONALISM (REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY)
Most twentieth-century theorists of statutory interpretation
have emphasized legislative intent, often in conjunction with statu-
tory text.25 Lieber endorses as the "true sense of any form of
words.., the sense which their author intended to convey."'26 Like
modern interpreters, Lieber would maintain that where the author
had a specific expectation about how a directive is to be inter-
preted, she makes that intention clear in the text of her directive;
he would also agree that it is undemocratic for unelected judges to
ignore the textually supported intention of elected legislators.
Hence, in matters of interpretation, there should rarely be a disso-
nance between text and specific intent. Yet Lieber admits the pos-
sibility of a dissonance between the letter of a statute and the best
meaning-a dissonance that is dissolved through "construction."
"Construction is the drawing of conclusions respecting sub-
jects, that lie beyond the direct expression of the text, from ele-
ments known from and given in the text-conclusions which are in
the spirit, though not within the letter of the text."' 27 .How can this
be? How can the interpreter, or the constructer, be faithful to the
text or the author's intentions if the constructer goes beyond the
text and the expectations? These are questions judges are usually
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (broadly phrased statutes such as the Sherman
Act are evolutive, changing in meaning as social understanding evolves).
23 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 43-44, 52 [at 1921, 19271.
24 Alex M. Johnson Jr. & Ross D. Taylor, Revolutionizing Judicial Interpretation of
Charitable Trusts: Applying Relational Contracts and Dynamic Interpretation to Cy Pres
and America's Cup Litigation, 74 IOWA L. REV. 545 (1989); see also Daniel A. Farber,
Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989) (also reviving
this idea).
25 See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, THE ART AND CRAFT OF JUDGING: THE DECISIONS OF
JUDGE LEARNED HAND (Hershel Shanks ed., 1968); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-93 (1985); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS
IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY
(1991); Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modi-
fied Intentionalist Approach,'63 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1988); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985).
26 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 11 [at 19001.
27 Id. at 44 [at 1921]; see id. at 45 [at 1922] ("[Cjonstruction is the causing of the text to
agree and harmonize with the demands or principles of superior authority, although they
are not, according to the immediate and direct meaning of the words constituting the text
contained in it.").
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not willing to confront openly, and law professors have long
avoided them as well. Lieber insists that these are unavoidable in-
quiries, "because times, relations, things change, and cannot be
foreseen by human intellect .... Many things are dangerous, yet
we cannot dispense with them nevertheless. ' 28 Lieber suggests or
develops several different ways of reconciling the fidelity the inter-
preter owes to the author's expectations and the practical need to
adapt a directive to changed circumstances.
A. Construction "Beyond" Versus "Against" the Author's
Expectations: The Requirement of Good Faith
The housekeeper tells the servant to fetch some soupmeat,
and the servant knows from prior dealings that the housekeeper
intends that he fetch a certain grade of beef from a specific store.
The servant arrives at the store and finds that the store has closed.
Should the servant return home empty-handed? Such action
would probably be obtuse. Instead, the servant should put himself
into the place of the author (housekeeper) and, given the author's
values and goals, should deal with the new circumstance in the way
the author would were she there. In the foregoing variation of the
soupmeat hypothetical, the housekeeper assumed that the store
was open; finding the store closed, the servant should ask himself:
What would the housekeeper have me do? In all probability, the
housekeeper would want the servant to go to another store and
purchase the soupmeat. But what if the servant goes to a nearby
store and finds soupmeat at double the price the household is ac-
customed to paying? Whether the servant should proceed to fetch
that (pricey) soupmeat is a harder question, and there is a good
case to be made that the servant should then return empty-handed.
(I am assuming that the housekeeper cannot be consulted by tele-
phone, a convenience unknown to Lieber.)
When circumstances have changed in ways such as these,
Lieber insists that the key obligation of the statutory interpreter
(the servant) is one of good faith:
Common sense and good faith are the leading stars of all genu-
ine interpretation. Be it repeated, our object is not to bend,
twist, or shape the text, until at last we may succeed in forcing it
into the mould of preconceived ideas, to extend or cut short in
28 Id. at 53 [at 1928].
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the manner of a Procrustes, but simply and solely to fix upon the
true sense, whatever that may be.29
This obligation of good faith is akin to more recent intentionalist
formulations, that the interpreter engage in a process of "imagina-
tive reconstruction" of what the author would have desired had she
known about the new circumstances. 30 Another felicitous way of
expressing this obligation is suggested by Lieber's careful formula-
tion that "construction endeavors to arrive at conclusions beyond
the absolute sense of the text," but still true to the spirit of the text,
while avoiding "extravagant construction [which] abandons" that
spirit.31 This anticipates the useful distinction drawn by Daniel
Farber, between an interpretation that goes "beyond" the author's
intent and one that goes "against" that intent.32 The servant who
buys at another store when the directed store is closed has gone
beyond the housekeeper's instruction but has engaged in responsi-
ble interpretation. But the servant who spends double the ex-
pected price for soupmeat might well pass the line suggested by
Lieber and Farber, going not only beyond the author's expecta-
tions, but also against them.
A clearer case of extravagant interpretation is one in which
the servant purchases an expensive, higher grade of beef than has
been the household's practice. When questioned about this extrav-
agance, the servant might say that this grade of beef is sometimes
used for soupmeat, but Lieber would insist that the servant is not
interpreting in good faith. He calls this "predestined" interpreta-
tion, where "the interpreter, either consciously or unknown to him-
self, yet laboring under a strong bias of mind, makes the text
subservient to his preconceived views, or some object he desires to
arrive at. '33  In this instance Lieber foresaw the legal realists'
claim that judges tend to read their own values into texts they in-
terpret,34 but condemned the practice as one that good-faith inter-
preters, and especially public officials such as judges, must avoid as
much as they can.
29 Id. at 77 [at 1945]. Good faith "means that we conscientiously desire to arrive at
truth" and "take the words fairly as they were meant." Id. at 80-81 [at 1947]. For similar
statements of common sense and good faith, see id. at 88, 109 [at 1952, 1966].
30 Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379 (1907); see also POs-
NER, supra note 25; Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes,
60 HARV. L. REV. 370 (1947).
31 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 53, 69 [at 1927, 1939] (emphases added).
32 See Farber, supra note 24.
33 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 60 [at 1933].
34 E.g., K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31-40
(1934).
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B. Apply Statutes to New Circumstances So As to Advance the
Statutes' Overall Goals
Peppered throughout Hermeneutics are admonitions to inter-
pret statutes in light of their "aims" or "objects. '35  The servant
told to fetch some soupmeat would interpret the directive very dif-
ferently for different purposes. He would, for example, purchase a
much higher grade of meat if the object of the directive were to
prepare a fine soup for the commencement of a fancy dinner party,
than if the purpose were to feed the children at lunch. If unfore-
seen circumstances thwart the housekeeper's original expectations,
the servant's practical response might well consider the purpose of
the directive in adapting it. If only day-old soupmeat is available at
the store, the servant should probably go somewhere else when the
goal of the fetching is to contribute to a fancy dinner party.
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks's materials on The Legal Pro-
cess built a whole theory of statutory interpretation around the
proposition that statutes rendered ambiguous by changed circum-
stances should be interpreted so as best to facilitate the statutes'
purposes.36 Their theory of statutory interpretation drew from the
Hermeneutics generally and from the soupmeat hypothetical spe-
cifically, for the hypothetical is reproduced at the beginning of The
Legal Process's chapter on statutory interpretation, under the ap-
proving heading, a "Breath of Fresh Air. 37 The Supreme Court
has long relied on the spirit or purpose of statutes as a primary tool
in statutory interpretation (albeit less so in recent years).38
C. Apply Statutes in Light of Fundamental Law
The servant told to fetch soupmeat might be confronted with
directives having greater authority than those issued by the house-
keeper. The town, for example, may have imposed an ordinance
35 E.g., LIEBER, supra note 1, at 136 [at 1988].
36 HART & SACKS, supra note 2, ch. 7; see also LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF
ITSELF (1940); Harry W. Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 COLUM. L.
REV. 957 (1940); Frederick J. de Sloovre, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88
U. PA. L. REV. 527 (1940).
37 HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1114.
38 The leading opinion, Church of the Holy 'Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457
(1892), distinctly echoes Hermeneutics by its invocation of the law's "spirit" to displace the
apparent plain meaning of a statutory text. Church of the Holy Trinity has, in turn, been
the focal point of the debate between the Supreme Court's "new textualists" and more
purpose-based interpreters. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S.
440 (1989) (majority opinion by Justice Brennan relying on Church of the Holy Trinity,
disputed by a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy questioning Church of the Holy Trin-
ity and a spirit-based approach to statutes).
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rationing the sale of meat, and the servant would not be able to
fetch the amount or grade of soupmeat desired by the house-
keeper. Or the servant might be well justified in returning empty-
handed. Lieber would approve of this "[t]ranscendent construction
• ..derived from, or founded upon, a principle superior to the
text."'39 To develop this point, Lieber anticipates Richard Posner's
analogy between the statutory interpreter and the platoon com-
mander who might be required to interpret battlefield commands
constructively or creatively.40 Embracing the proposition that an
"inferior officer has to obey the superior," Lieber sensibly admits
the possibility of resistance "if the former is convinced that the lat-
ter is committing an act of treason .... Why? Because general
safety is a law superior even to military or naval discipline. '41
Both jurists and legal scholars have shown great enthusiasm
for a corollary to Lieber's idea of "transcendent" interpretation.
That is, interpreters should construe directives, if possible, to avoid
conflicts with the superior or fundamental law in the Constitution.
Consistent with Lieber's generally libertarian philosophy, courts
will sometimes interpret statutes narrowly even when a broader in-
terpretation would not be unconstitutional but would only raise
constitutional "difficulties." 42  Thus, the servant ordered to fetch
soupmeat would return empty-handed not only in the event that
the state was rationing soupmeat, but also in the event the state
restricted consumption of "luxury foodstuffs," it being unclear
whether soupmeat fell into that category.
III. DYNAMICISM (EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION)
Long before twentieth-century theories of dynamic statutory
interpretation became fashionable,43 Lieber maintained that the
statutory meaning found by a subsequent interpreter would often
be different from the meaning a contemporary interpreter (or legis-
39 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 65 [at 1936]; see id. at 67 [at 1938] (Lieber recognized that
"dangerous" transcendent interpretation is "not always unavoidable").
40 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE ch. 7 (1990).
41 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 101 [at 1961].
42 See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
43 Most theorizing about statutory interpretation since 1982 has emphasized the ways in
which statutes evolve. E.g., FRANCIS BENNION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1984);
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE (1986); ESKRIDGE, supra note 2; DENNIS PATTERSON,
LAW AND TRUTH (forthcoming 1995); POSNER, supra note 40, ch. 7; CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990); T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988);
Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of
Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1990).
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lator) would have reached. Lieber posited that the primary reason
for statutory evolution is changed circumstances, and Hermeneutics
can also be read to suggest that changing values might also be the
basis for statutory evolution. Both propositions find echoes in re-
cent theories of statutory interpretation. The main way in which
recent theories have departed from Lieber is their suggestion that
the ideological and institutional context of the interpreter will
often be decisive.
A. Changed Circumstances and the Practical
Adaptation of Statutes,
Hermeneutics provides a classic statement of the practical rea-
sons for statutory evolution:
The farther removed the time of the origin of any text may
be from us, the more we are at times authorized or bound.., to
resort to extensive construction. For times and the relations of
things change, and if the laws, &c., do not change accordingly, to
effect which is rarely in the power of the construer, they must be
applied according to the altered circumstances, if they shall con-
tinue to mean sense or to remain beneficial.... Whether we
rejoice in it or not, the world moves on, and no man can run
against the movement of his time. Laws must be understood to
mean something for the advantage of society; and if obsolete
laws are not abolished by the proper authority, practical life it-
self, that is, the people, will and must abolish them, or alter
them in their application."
As a statement of statutory evolution because of changed circum-
stances, this excerpt precisely anticipated the legal realists' theories
of interpretation,45 as well as more recent dynamic theories, and
even Guido Calabresi's proposal that courts be able to overrule
obsolescent laws.46
Before embarking on a lengthy trip, the housekeeper tells the
servant to fetch two pounds of soupmeat every Monday. This di-
rective will probably be clear for awhile, but changed circum-
stances may present new issues of interpretation (or, as Lieber calls
this exercise, construction). The housekeeper might forgo the
fetching if the price of soupmeat doubles, or the state reports that
soupmeat might be infected, or the children in the household de-
44 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 125-26 [at 1980-82] (footnote omitted).
45 See JOHN C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1916); Charles P.
Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407 (1950); Arthur W.
Phelps, Factors Influencing Judges in Interpreting Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 456 (1950).
46 See GUiDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
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velop allergies to soupmeat, or a host of other unanticipated cir-
cumstances. These are all legitimate constructions. Like Richard
Posner's platoon commander facing unanticipated battlefield con-
ditions,47 or Alex Johnson's cy pres judge applying a trust instru-
ment to circumstances beyond the imagination of the author,4 8 or
my diplomat presented with a political surprise,49 the interpreter
applying statutes to unforeseen circumstances is performing badly
if all she does is apply the law's plain or originally intended mean-
ing. "Great evil has arisen at various epochs from insisting on es-
tablished laws in times of great crisis," Lieber warned. 0
On the other hand, Lieber hardly believed that the dynamic
interpreter is an unfettered interpreter, and he maintained that the
habit of liberty requires close interpretation in most cases:
The result of our considerations then will be, that we ought
to adhere to close construction, as long as we can; but we must
not forget that the "letter killeth," and an enlarged construction
becomes necessary when the relations of things enlarge or
change. We ought to be careful, however, not to misjudge our
own times; for every one who is desirous of justifying an extrav-
agant construction does it on the ground, that the case is of a
peculiar character and the present time a crisis."'
Just as the housekeeper should not be quick to abandon or alter
her directive, so the statutory interpreter should ordinarily
hew closely to the statutory text and should update statutes cau-
tiously. Lieber's cautiously libertarian dynamicism approximately
describes the Supreme Court's current approach to statutory
interpretation. 2
B. Interpretation to Reflect Public Values
At various points, Hermeneutics suggests the importance of
"values" in statutory interpretation. Although modem norm-
based theories of statutory interpretation are much more explicit
and elaborate than Lieber's relatively undeveloped thinking, he
47 POSNER, supra note 40, ch. 7.
48 See Johnson & Taylor, supra note 24.
49 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv.
1479 (1987).
50 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 128 [at 1982].
51 Id. at 129 [at 1983].
52 The best examples from the 1993 Term are Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114
S. Ct. 2396 (1994); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994); Staples v. United
States, 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994). These and other cases are situated in the Court's libertarian
context by William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994).
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does plant the seeds of such theories (see my discussion above)
and, more interestingly, lays out some tentative precepts appropri-
ate for a norm-based theory.
Lieber's faint anticipation of later theory is best perceived in
two of his precepts: "Whenever a decision between the powerful
and the weak depends upon our construction, the benefit of the
doubt is given to the weak";53 and "Let mercy prevail if there be a
real doubt. ' 54 These precepts lend obvious support to the old (and
now more important than ever before) rule of lenity, that penal
statutes should be closely construed, so as to protect the liberty of
those accused of violating vague criminal laws." Somewhat more
indirectly, these precepts suggest a "representation-reinforcing"
approach to statutory interpretation: if there is ambiguity, interpret
a statute against the interests of powerful groups, and in favor of
groups underrepresented in the political process.5 6 The house-
keeper should be reluctant to punish a servant who dawdles in
fetching soupmeat unless the housekeeper (or past practices)
makes it clear that haste is required.
Lieber also states that, "in general, the higher prevails over
the lower, the principle over a specific direction."5  The ideas
pregnant in such a formulation are quite undeveloped in the Her-
meneutics, but passages such as this can be read as a general antici-
pation of the twentieth-century legal process idea that statutes
should be read in light of background "principles" or "policies. 58
Hart and Sacks first articulated this interpretive approach, which
has been the basis for more than a few Supreme Court decisions as
well.5 9 Drawing from Hart and Sacks (and perhaps indirectly
therefore also from Lieber), Ronald Dworkin and Cass Sunstein
53 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 134 [at 1986-87]; see id. at 137 [at 1988] ("Let the weak have
the benefit of a doubt, without defeating the general object of the law.").
54 Id. at 137 [at 1988].
55 Lieber also sets out the rule of lenity as a separate precept: "If any doubt of the
meaning exists in penal laws or rules, they ought to be construed in favor of the accused; of
course, without injury to any one else." Id. at 165 [at 2007].
56 JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980), develops a representation-rein-
forcement theory of judicial review, and ESKRIDGE, supra note 2, ch. 5, extends this theory
to statutory interpretation.
57 LIEBER, supra note 1, at 135 [at 1987]. The publication editor of the third edition
distinguishes this precept from its opposite concerning laws where a specific law will gov-
ern over a more general one. Id. at 135 n.15 [at 1987 n.28].
58 This idea is developed in HART & SACKS, supra note 2, ch. 1; Fuller, supra note 8
(opinion of Foster, J.).
59 The most celebrated, and notorious, being Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574 (1983). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989) (surveying other cases).
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have developed theories of interpretation where national "princi-
ples" (Dworkin) or "background norms" (Sunstein) exercise gravi-
tational pull on interpretive outcomes.60
C. Lieber's Inattention to the Ideological and Institutional
Dimensions of Statutory Evolution
Lieber's understanding of statutory evolution is as old as Ath-
ens, for it is based upon the practical reasoning in response to
changed (societal, legal, and constitutional) circumstances that Ar-
istotle first announced. 61 Modem theorizing about statutory inter-
pretation has expanded upon this sort of changed circumstances
reasoning to posit other, deeper, reasons why statutory interpreta-
tion will be dynamic. Notwithstanding my claim that Lieber's Her-
meneutics was prescient, I now maintain that it was far from
omniscient. The soupmeat hypothetical exemplifies Lieber's na-
ivete about why statutes evolve. This sort of problem-like the
platoon commander, cy pres, and diplomat analogies-misunder-
stands the interesting issues of statutory dynamicism, because it in-
volves an institutionally and ideologically elementary situation.
Where there is ideological distance between author and interpreter
or where there is a richer institutional context for interpretation,
hermeneutics works very differently from Lieber's assumed model.
Lieber believed that differently situated interpreters, acting in
good faith, could reach similar interpretations, even in hard cases.
This belief strikes many modem theorists as naive. TWentieth-cen-
tury hermeneutical theories insist that interpretation depends criti-
cally upon the perspective of the interpreter; differently situated
interpreters will render strikingly different readings of the same
statute.62 That is, two intelligent people considering the same text,
legislative background, and precedents (and acting diligently and in
good faith) can easily render diametrically opposed interpretations,
because they filter that evidence through different understandings
about the world. To take a specific example, one's willingness to
60 See DWORKIN, supra note 43; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).
61 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics (Terence Irwin trans., 1985).
62 This point is developed in this Symposium by Georgia Warnke, The One True Sense,
16 CARDOZo L. REV. 2191 (1995). For explication in the legal literature, see LEGAL HER-
MENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRAcrCE (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992); William N. Es-
kridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1990); Francis J.
Mootz, III, The Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry
Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. REV. 523 (1988);
Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance and
Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 335 (1988).
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interpret Title VII to permit voluntary affirmative action depends
critically on one's situated understanding of racial justice in
America.63 The perspective of an African American who laid his
life on the line for racial integration (such as Justice Marshall) will
be different from that of an Italian American who has seen ethnic
groups overcome prejudice without state help (such as Justice
Scalia), and both perspectives will differ from the perspective of
women who struggled against sexist barriers to their careers (such
as Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg). Each of these individuals
can-and do-construct different meanings out of the same raw
materials, because their angles of vision differ. The soupmeat hy-
pothetical, where the housekeeper and servant operate within simi-
lar intellectual frameworks, is therefore substantially irrelevant to
the more exciting statutory interpretation cases today.
Even more limiting is the simple institutional framework sug-
gested by the soupmeat hypothetical, namely, a principal (the
housekeeper) and an agent (the servant). Statutory interpretation
in the United States involves decisions made by coordinate
branches of government-usually the executive and the judicial
branches-in a context of institutional interdependence. The exec-
utive agency interpreting a statute is not necessarily interested in
following Lieber's rules of good faith interpretation; instead, the
agency is motivated to engage in what Lieber calls predestined in-
terpretation (reading its own policy into the statute), limited only
by whatever trumping mechanisms the American lawmaking pro-
cess offers. One of the trumping institutions is the judiciary, of
course, but modern political theory suggests that courts are not
Lieber's faithful agents but are instead coordinate centers of law-
making authority that engage in their own strategic version of
predestined interpretation.64 Thus, when the Supreme Court inter-
preted Title VII to allow voluntary affirmative action, it was not
necessarily engaged in Lieber's exercise of faithfully reading the
text, legislative history, statutory purpose, and relevant precedents.
Instead, a strategic Court was bending the statute to reflect its own
63 This is the argument of ESKRIDGE, supra note 2, analyzing United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), from many different angles.
64 The political science literature includes WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDI-
CIAL STRATEGY (1964); C. HERMAN PRITCHETr, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME
COURT: 1957-1960 (1961); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). The legal literature includes ROBERT A.
KATZMANN, INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY: THE SAGA OF TRANSPORTATION POLICY FOR
THE DISABLED (1986); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 52; Symposium, Positive Political
Theory and Public Law, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992).
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policy preferences, carefully mindful of the political consequences
of alternative readings.65
Notwithstanding my admiration for Lieber's Hermeneutics,
which develops traditional theory about as far as it can be devel-
oped, I end this tribute with an insistence that a modem intellec-
tual understanding of statutory interpretation must develop
post-Lieber lines of inquiry.66 The modem-even more the
postmodem-student of statutory interpretation must seek insight
from more recent perspectivist and institutionalist theories. The
soupmeat hypothetical is only a starting point for understanding
the next century's debates about statutory interpretation.-
65 This reading of the affirmative action cases is developed in ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY,
supra note 2, ch. 1. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991).
66 Michael Herz observed to me that Lieber himself was a political scientist who under-
stood the complexity of institutional relationships and that the soupmeat hypothetical is
only one of several in Hermeneutics. As to the first part, Herz and I both think that Her-
meneutics little reflects institutional complexity, and I insist that is a severe limitation. As
to the second point, the soupmeat hypothetical is, I believe, representative of the hypothet-
icals in the book in its neglect of ideological or institutional considerations.
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